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ABSTRACT
POEISIS AS POLITICAL EDUCATOR: ARISTOTLE AND THE PURPOSE OF POEISIS
Stephen Clouse, M.A.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2014
Andrea Radasanu, Director
This inquiry into Aristotle's thought focuses on the relationship between the poetic arts
and moral education. Specifically, it looks at whether poetry can be used as a means for teaching
moral virtue. Aristotle is clear that the arts, broadly speaking, are inferior to virtue. However, the
political context of poetry as well as Aristotle's account of katharsis and the relationship between
philosophy and poetry seem to indicate that the purpose of poetry may serve an educative
function in the life of the city. I argue that while poetry is not moral education, it serves an
educative role by facilitating an inquiry into the moral and intellectual virtues and how those
virtues relate to the human condition.
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INTRODUCTION

Using literature as a way to understand politics is not a new idea in the history of political
thought. Typically, literature is seen as a way to understand how a particular people existed at a
particular time and place, serving as a form of fictional ethnography.1 One example of this is in
Catherine Zuckert's work using American novels to understand American political thought.2 She
is utilizing literature in order to speak both about particular historical circumstances as well as
the enduring characteristics of a people. This fictional ethnographic method of literary analysis is
not the only perspective on how to assess literature in a political way.
A different method is found in Steven Pinker's argument that literature had a pacifying
effect on people in the 17th and 18th centuries, referring to the era as the Republic of Letters.3
For him, the behavior of the audience was modified through their participation with literature.
The central issue is what kind of education is being provided by engaging with a work of fiction.
Is this education primarily derived from the pleasure experienced by the reader? Is the education
provided through the emotional progression one takes through the plot of the story? Is the
education a result of intellectual reflection after completing the initial experience with the work?
Is the education particularized only to a specific range of emotional responses generated by the
work? One central presumption that exists amongst these questions, and is perhaps central to the

1

By this, I mean an exploration into the actions, behaviors, customs, etc. of particular persons at a particular time
and place, but the plot is the creation of imagination.
2
See, "On Reading Classic American Novelists as Political Thinkers," The Journal of Politics 43, 683-706. Also see
her, "The Political Thought of Nathaniel Hawthorne," Polity 13, 163-183.
3
Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature Why Violence has Declined (New York, NY: Penguin, 2011) 177183.
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issue of education itself, is that literature has political ramifications on its audience. This
presumption is predicated on the idea that literature has an effect on the behaviors of its audience
and that those behaviors, in turn, mold political actions.
This relationship between literature and political action dates back to the ancient Greeks,
with both the pre-Socratics and Plato addressing the 'ancient feud between philosophy and
poetry.' However, can poetry be understood as a form of literature, particularly given that poetry,
for most of the ancient Greek culture, is actually a supernatural explanation for the phenomenon
of the natural world? This debate between the rational and supernatural explanations of the world
is the foundation of the feud between philosophy and poetry. Poetry is the translation of the
Greek poeisis which translates as, "to make or to create" and therefore could also be translated
into literature or fiction. Therefore, Aristotle's response to the feud is helpful because it provides
a way to discuss this tension and establishes a lens for assessing whether or not poetry provides a
political education to its audience. This, then, allows for a subsequent inquiry into the questions
latent within the issue of seeing literature as an educator because they are just as prevalent with
poetry.
Before attempting to construct an answer for whether or not poeisis can serve as a
political educator, there are several foundational premises that have to be established. I will do
this in two segments. The first will aim at examining the political context of Greek tragedy and
establishing a definition of katharsis. The second will explore Aristotle's contention on the
primacy of plot and the superiority of poetry to history as well as the relationship between equity
and poetry, and then evaluate the epistemological relationship between virtue, action, and plot.
Once these premises have been established, it is possible to provide a potential answer to the
issue of using poetry to teach virtue, namely that poetry may not be able to directly habituate

3

people toward virtue, but may, instead, aim them toward a better understanding of what it means
to be a virtuous human being.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF POETRY

Before beginning an exploration into Aristotle's perspective on whether or not tragedy
provides a moral education, the framework of ancient Greek poetry must be briefly established
given Aristotle's empirical methodology. This method is predicated on responding to the
opinions and perspectives of his time and utilizing them to discover universal causes. If the
historical and political context is not established, then his mode of inquiry is vastly undermined
and the depth of his insight is marginalized. To begin, ancient Greek poetry1 is, in several critical
ways, vastly different than contemporary performance art. First, poetry was performed at a
religious festival, typically the Dionysia, which was deeply tethered to the political life of the
city through both the contributions of citizens and the oversight of the state. Michael Kellogg
points out that the
[religious events] included sacred rituals, sacrifices, dithyrambic (choral) contests,
the three days of tragedies, and the day set aside for comedies. Important political and
military leaders were prominently in attendance, and spectators gathered from throughout
the Greek world..2
The link between the religious festival and the latent democratic norms of the theatre,
particularly in a post-Periclan Athens3, means that the exposure to poetry would have been wide

1

I use this term with the understanding that it is aligned with Aristotle's inclusive word poiesis which encompasses,
"Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry." Ingram Bywater, trans., Aristotle's Poetics, found
in Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), pg. 1455, line 1447a
15 . Unless otherwise noted, all citations will come from the Ingram Bywater translation. All future citations will
provide the name of the text and the line number only.
2
Michael K. Kellogg, The Greek Search for Wisdom, (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2012), pg. 81.
3
Ibid, pg. 81. Here, Kellogg points out that," A fund established by Pericles allowed all Athenian citizens to attend
the theater free of charge."
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scale. This, combined with the fact that the Greek religion is not based in dogma but in ritual,
means attendance at the religious festivals would have been nearly universal.4
The works of Homer and Hesiod were also ubiquitous in ancient Athenian life, serving as
a foundation for both moral and religious education. Hugh Lloyd-Jones argues that, "People
learned about the gods, and about the justice of Zeus, not from sacred books but from the poets,
notably from the early poets, Homer and Hesiod."5 Greek religion, then, was not predicated on
divine revelation in the way that the Abrahamic religions were, but instead, was understood
through the works of the muse who spoke through the poet. Poetry, then, was the connection
between the gods and man. The universality of poetry can also be found in Plato's comment that
there are those who are, "praisers of Homer who say that this poet educated Greece".6 However,
Plato also contends that, "only so much of poetry as is hymns to gods or celebration of good men
should be admitted into a city,"7 which is representative of the tension between philosophy and
poetry, between providing an explanation of phenomenon through reason or through revelation.8
This tension shows how seriously Plato took poetry because he understood the power the poets
had since they were, at least as far as Greek custom was concerned, displaying the relationship
between the gods and man. This placed the poets, especially Homer and Hesiod but also the later
tragedians and comedians, in a place of pivotal influence over the behavior of Greek citizens.

4

See Hugh Lloyd-Jones, "Ancient Greek Religion," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 145
(December, 2001), pg. 460-462.
5
Ibid, pg. 461.
6
Allan Bloom, trans., The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1991), pg. 290, line 606e.
7
Ibid, pg. 290, line 607a.
8
Though falling outside of the parameters of this essay, this tension is explored by various others elsewhere. See
Elliot Bartky, "Plato and the Politics of Aristotle's 'Poetics,'" The Review of Politics 54 (Autumn, 1992), pg. 598-607;
Thomas Shearer Duncan, "Plato and Poetry," The Classical Journal 40 (May, 1945), pg. 481-494; M. Pabst Battin,
"Plato on True and False Poetry," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 36 (Winter, 1977), pg. 163-174; Irwin
Edman, "Poetry and Truth in Plato," The Journal of Philosophy 33 (October, 1936), pg. 605-609.
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This prevalence displays why the state would have had such a compelling interest in
regulating the content of the tragedies being performed at the religious festivals. By the fifth
century, tragedies were composed of actors, minstrels, and a chorus, which would range in size
depending upon the funding that was available. Franz Stoessl points out that,
The equipping of the choruses was one of the duties rich citizens had to perform for the
community and was equivalent to a tax on their property. If a poet wanted to perform a
tragedy he had first to apply to the archon who was in charge of the festival.9
Therefore, citizens were not simply consumers of poetry, but they were also vital participants in
the construction of the product. He continues that, "The archon could grant or refuse the chorus.
Thus it depended upon the state and its officials whether or not a poet could perform a
drama...dramatic art was subject to the struggle of political forces and was itself a part of this
struggle."10 The archon, being drawn from the tumultuous nature of the Athenian political
landscape, would have been politically sensitive to the content of the plays that were performed
at the religious festivals, and, therefore, had an interest in making sure that the tragedies and
comedies that were performed met a certain level of state appropriateness insomuch as the
political condition in Athens was tolerant of the poet's perspective. If the poets had the power to
shape moral and religious practices, then the poetry performed at the festivals would have had
the ability to rile up the passions of the audience. The state, then, had a role to play in regulating
the interpretation of the interaction between gods and man at the state sponsored religious
festival, if for nothing else, to regulate the passions of the democratic populace.
The active oversight of the Greek state into the content of poetry should not be seen as
something foreign to the Greek perspective. One thing to be cautious of here is to assign the

9

Franz Stoessl, "Aeschylus as a Political Thinker" The American Journal of Philology 73 (1952): 113
Ibid, 113.
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'state' a modern understanding of an entity distinct from the people with an overarching
bureaucratic labyrinth.11 Instead, the state and the populace, particularly in fifth century Athens,
would have been integrated so deeply that to make a distinction between state and citizen would
be better stated as a state office-holder and potential office-holder. This is the foundation of
Aristotle's claim that, "He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial
administration of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that state; and, speaking generally, a
state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life."12 Citizens are those who have the
ability to take place in the ruling of the state, but are also included in those that are ruled; citizens
are both ruled and ruler. Therefore, the state, as such, is not an entity that is disconnected from
the people and rules over them, but instead, is something that is comprised of individuals who
share in ruling others and being ruled by others. The state, then, is something that is
indistinguishable from the populace, and thus, those things that would rile the populace would
also rile the state.
Returning to the prominent place of poetry, what role would the poets have taken given
the influence of their craft? Peter Arnott argues that
In the fifth century at least, the drama, like all poetry, was considered primarily as a
teaching medium. The poet was the didaskalos, teacher, not merely in the sense that he
taught his actors and choruses, but also with the implication that he instructed his public,
through a medium that offered the widest possibilities for the dissemination of ideas and
information, and which could also, in a single hearing, reach the greater part of the body
politic.13
11

See Greg Anderson, "The Personality of the Greek State," The Journal of Hellenic Studies 129 (2009), pg. 1-22.
Here Anderson sets out to explore whether or not the Greek 'state' actually aligns with our contemporary
conception of statehood. See also Anthony D. Smith, The Antiquity of Nations, (Malden; Polity Press, 2008). Smith
sets out, particularly in chapter five, to do exactly what one should not do: apply modern concepts of the nation
back into antiquity, but his discussion is fruitful nonetheless because it shows the way that we understand the
state is antithetical to the ancients.
12
Aristotle, Politics, 1275b 18-21.
13
Peter Arnott, "Greek Drama as Education," Educational Theatre Journal 22 (1970), pg. 35.

8

This indicates that the poet, confirming Plato's concern, was a person who had great political
influence since his craft was able to reach nearly every citizen and actively engage them in the
craft. Arnott goes on to point out that Aristophanes, in The Frogs, is able to make Aeschylus
defend the position of whether or not the poet was actually a kind of teacher for the populace.
This demonstrates that the convention was so widely believed that he was able to parody it
without having to set-up the paradigm within the comedy.14
Plato's criticism of poetry clearly indicates that he, too, saw the poet as a kind of teacher
and was concerned with the kind of things being taught by the poets. This is derived from the
political influence that poetry had over the populace, their work being nearly ubiquitous amongst
the citizenry. This is partially why Aristotle argues that the tragedies, for the most part, "adhere
to the historic names,"15 meaning that a poet could presume a baseline familiarity with the
characters and events from the members of the audience. This further re-enforces the fact that the
poet was a kind of a teacher of the populace, and that their craft, being a certain manifestation of
the relationship between the divine and man, placed them in a central role as a teaching agent.
Within this political context of poetry, as a prominent political institution, a unifying tool
for teaching identity, a medium between the divine and the secular, and a democratic product and
process, tragedy and comedy rose to their pinnacle in fifth century Athens. By the time Aristotle
was writing, nearly a century later, the flourishing of the art had diminished, but the power of the
medium still held sway. This is the context of Aristotle's Poetics, understanding poetry as an
artistic medium, an ethical tool, a political tool, a religious staple, and a political process. With

14

Ibid, pg. 36.
Aristotle, Poetics, found in Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: The Modern Library,
2001), 1464.
15

9

this framework in mind, it's now beneficial to explore one of the most difficult terms in
Aristotle's perspective on poetry, katharsis.

KATHARSIS
The opening lines of the Poetics indicate that the arts are a mimesis - a representation1 meaning that they fall under the broad category of the technical crafts (techne) but are a
particular kind of techne, one that is representative of the nature of the form of human action
(praxis).2 Aristotle says, "Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and
most flute playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of mimesis,"3 indicating
that poetry falls within a broader range of mimetic arts. In Book 8 of the Politics, Aristotle
clearly indicates that musical education, which falls under this overarching category of mimetic
arts, is a critical facet for understanding the proper use of leisure time.4 Leisure time is, "better
than occupation and is its end; and therefore the question must be asked, what ought we to do
when at leisure?"5 Aristotle, in the subsequent discussion, outlines that we must be educated to
the proper end of leisure, namely, toward happiness (eudaimonia), and that musical education
has been included in the curriculum because it is for the "intellectual enjoyment in leisure."6
Given that music is a mimetic art, does this indicate that the other mimetic arts are also aimed at

1

On this point, see Stephen Halliwell, trans., Aristotle's Poetics (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill
1987), pg. 71. Halliwell contends that 'mimesis' has often been translated as 'imitation' but instead should be
translated as 'representation' because the English word 'imitation' does not have the same connotation as
'mimesis,' - he argues that the plasticity of the word 'representation' is more applicable.
2
See Silvia Carli, "Poetry is More Philosophical than History: Aristotle on Mimesis and Form," Review of
Metaphysics 64 (December, 2010), pg. 305.
3
Aristotle, Poetics, line 1447a 15. I have changed Bywater's 'imitation' back to 'mimesis' and will do so for all
citations. Given the difficulty noted on translating mimesis into either imitation or representation, I have chosen to
keep the transliterated word in order to avoid the translation issues.
4
Benjamin Jowett, trans., Aristotle's Politics, found in ibid, 1307. All future citations will include the name of the
text and the line numbers only.
5
Ibid, 1338a 32-35 .
6
Ibid, 1338b 22.
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the intellectual enjoyment of leisure? Perhaps the even more difficult problem, however, is not
the active participation in creating the mimetic art, as is the case with playing an instrument or
creating a play or painting, but in the passive participation of the mimetic art, as in watching a
play, and whether or not this passive kind of participation also serves an educational purpose.
This distinction, between the active and passive experiences with the mimetic arts, is something
that will be discussed at more length later in the essay, but it is necessary to acknowledge it as a
problem, especially as it relates to defining katharsis.
In the Poetics, Aristotle argues that tragedy is the best form of poetry because it is more
noble and serious than the others.7 It also provides Aristotle's perspective on what the purpose of
tragedy is, what the best way to achieve that purpose is, and what makes an excellent tragedy. It,
however, does not provide a clear answer to whether or not the passive participation in the
mimetic arts provides a particular kind of education. There is a great deal of controversy over
this topic, specifically over Aristotle's use of the term 'katharsis' and the relationship katharsis
has with tragedy, namely with the emotions of pity and fear. Before delving into whether or not
Aristotle does in fact contend that even passive participation in the mimetic arts does provide an
education, it's necessary to first explore the purpose of katharsis which is, perhaps, one of the
most difficult topics to contend with in the surviving writing of Aristotle. In order to do this, it is
beneficial to outline the contending perspectives on the purpose of katharsis to construct a
framework that underlies the exploration of poetry as a moral teacher.
Part of the difficulty in defining the purpose of katharsis is that Aristotle never provides a
clear definition of what the term means, and he uses it in different ways in different texts. For
example, he says in the Politics that,
7

Aristotle, Poetics, 1448b 25 - 1449a 30.
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We maintain further that music should be studied, not for the sake of one, but of many
benefits, that is to say, with a view to (1) education, (2) katharsis (the word 'katharsis'
we use to present without explanation, but when hereafter we speak of poetry, we will
treat the subject with more precision); music may also serve (3) for intellectual
enjoyment, for relaxation and for recreation after exertion.8
This passage indicates that, at least for music, katharsis is different than the intellectual
enjoyment and the educational purpose of music. It also shows that Aristotle intended to explore
the idea of katharsis more in the Poetics, but there he rarely uses the term except insomuch as to
say it is part of the function of tragedy.9 This leads to the foundation of the tension over what
katharsis means to Aristotle. From the cited passage from the Politics, Jowett translated
katharsis as 'purgation,' which is indicative of one of the perspectives on katharsis. W.F. Trench
contends that this understanding of catharsis dates to the Renaissance period. There some held
that the purpose of katharsis was, "to get so hardened by the sight of human suffering in drama,
that we should be able to pass it by unmoved when we met it in real life."10 This would mean that
the purpose of tragedy was to actually purge the emotional response out of the human condition.
In essence, this transforms the emotions into a pathology that need to be removed from the
body.11 However, this perspective misunderstands Aristotle's perspective on the emotions.

8

Aristotle, Politics, 1341b 35-40. I have changed Jowlett's translation of 'katharsis' as 'purgation' back to the
transliteration. I have done this in order to avoid any unnecessary confusion in the subsequent discussion.
9
Aristotle, Poetics, 1449b 22-28
10
W.F. Trench, "The Function of Poetry According to Aristotle," An Irish Quarterly Review 19 (December, 1930),
550. See also Baxter Hathaway, The Age of Criticism: The Late Renaissance in Italy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1962), pp. 205-300.
11
Jonathan Lear, "Katharsis," Phronesis 33 (1988), pg. 297, 299. Halliwell also contends that this is the foundation
of the perspective, noting that this perspective fundamentally misunderstands Aristotle's perspective on the
emotions of pity and fear. See Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics, 90. Trench also agrees with this perspective, arguing
that Bernays perspective caused 'criticism [to] break away on a false scent again.' See Trench, "Function of Poetry,"
pg. 551. Leon Golden also rejects this perspective. See Leon Golden, "The Purgation Theory of Catharsis," The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 31 (Summer, 1973), pg. 473-479. The overwhelming perspective is that the
use of 'katharsis' as a purging of the emotions is an inappropriate translation of the Greek as well as being
disconnected from the context of Greek culture. However, the other consensus is the fact that while katharsis is
understood as 'to cleanse', the moral underpinnings of 'purge' or even 'cleanse' is not present in the Greek.
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Jonathan Lear argues that katharsis cannot be a purging of emotions, as the term is used
in the biological works of Aristotle12, because the emotions are not just feelings, but also include
"an orientation toward the world."13 Lear is correct here. Aristotle argues in the Rhetoric that,
"The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are
also attended by pain or pleasure,"14 and continues, using the topic of anger for his launching
point that, "we must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people
are with whom they usually get angry, and (3) on what ground they get angry with them."15
Here, it is clear that the emotion is not simply the actual feeling of anger, but also the intellectual
condition that corresponds to the emotion. More support for this comes from Aristotle's
discussion of fear. He says that, "fear is felt by those who believe something to be likely to
happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, and at a particular
time."16 The emotions, therefore, are not simply reactions to stimuli; they are predicated on our
character. I will return to this topic later when discussing the relationship between virtue and the
emotions, but it is essential to establish that katharsis cannot be a removal of the emotional
reactions to stimuli from the human experience. Ultimately, both Trench and Lear disregard this
perspective as being fundamentally flawed, and thus, contend that the perspective has lost
relevancy.17

12

See Lear, "Katharsis," pg. 298-301. His discussion of Aristotle using 'catharsis' to mean a kind of physical
expulsion, specifically menstrual discharge, is particularly useful. He rejects the notion that Aristotle was intending
to use catharsis in this way when discussing the mimetic arts. Even if he did intend that catharsis have a cleansing
effect on the audience, it is a different kind of cleansing than that of a bodily release.
13
Lear, "Katharsis," pg. 302.
14
W. Rhys Roberts, trans., Aristotle's Rhetorica found in McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: The
Modern Library, 2001), pg. 1380, line 1378a 20-21. All future citations will provide the name of the text and the
line number only.
15
Aristotle, Rhetorica, 1378a 23-26.
16
Ibid, 1382b 33-35
17
See Trent, "The Function of Poetry," 551 and Lear, "Katharsis," 302.
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The next perspective to consider is that Aristotle is responding to Plato's criticism of
poetry in the Republic, and that he is redefining the kathartic experience. Halliwell argues that,
"We can be moderately confident only that [the Poetics] offers a response to the Platonic view
that tragedy arouses emotions which ought, for the sake of general psychological and moral wellbeing, to be kept in check (Republic 10, 603-5)."18 This would mean that the Platonic perspective
on katharsis is to direct the emotions to their proper end; that the unleashing of emotions must be
limited to the appropriate places, and to the appropriate times. The question, then, is whether or
not Plato is seeking to do the same thing as Aristotle regarding katharsis. Elliot Bartky argues
that, "Plato's quarrel with tragedy is not, then, with its erotic appeal but...with its inability to
direct eros to its proper end."19 Tragedy, according to Bartky's interpretation of Plato, is not
flawed because it swells the emotions but because it improperly directs the emotions.
This improper direction is what leads Bartky to argue that, for Plato, tragedy is inferior to
the epic poems of Homer in providing this direction. Bartky argues that,
The success of both tragedy and epic requires the catharsis of those pathological desires
for family and property. Catharsis occurs when the fear and pity of the audience are
aroused through the witnessing of the destruction of families and fortunes. Plato,
recognizing that the subject matter of tragic poetry is the warfare which results in the
destruction of families and fortunes, knows that Homer points beyond the common
understanding of the war over families and fortunes. By arousing passions which the city
had fought to suppress, especially the fear of death, Homer leads us to consider the
failure of the city.20
While the aim here is not to juxtapose the thought of Plato and Aristotle on tragedy, Barkty's
point is one to consider21, particularly with regard to Aristotle responding to Plato, because it

18

Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics, 90.
Bartky, "Plato and the Politics of Aristotle's 'Poetics,'" pg. 595.
20
Ibid, pg. 603.
21
His contention of the 'pathological condition of family and fortune' must be understood as a Platonic perspective
and not an Aristotelian one. Aristotle does not contend that the family and private property are things that
19
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raises the issue of the political nature of poetry and whether the purpose of poetry should be
political or apolitical. First, in this sense, katharsis seems to mean a different kind of cleansing
than the numbing of the body toward emotional stimuli. Here, it seems to play both a pacifying
and realigning role. Katharsis, from this Platonic perspective, is aimed at allowing the correct
emotions to be released in order to aim the audience at something higher than their particular
concerns. Therefore, the works of Homer are better at providing this ascension away from the
particular and toward the universal. Bartky's contention that Homer's kartharsis moves us toward
fearing death and away from the divisions of the city would seem to indicate that Homer's work,
in a sense, is post-political; it is attempting to shift the focus of the audience away from their
contingent existence and toward a higher understanding of what it means to live. If this is the
case, then it would follow that the Homeric poems are more aligned with Socratic philosophy
insomuch as it deals with political concerns but it's aim is meta-political.
It is in this sense, in causing the audience to move away from their particular political
concerns and toward the more universalistic life of the philosopher that Plato and Aristotle
perhaps contrast most starkly. It is because the tragedians are able to swell both fear and pity
toward the plight of the family, the fragility of fortune, and the contingent nature of man's
existence that Aristotle argues that tragedy is better than epic poetry.22 The scope of tragedy is
narrower, which augments its ability to generate katharsis. To Plato, the appeal of the Homeric
epic is to disconnect the individual from their particular political circumstance and connect them
with the universality of their humanity. Aristotle, in contrast, utilizes the particularity of tragedy

jeopardize the utilization of justice, whereas, Plato's discussion of the city in speech seem to indicate that these
two things are hindrances to the application of true justice when a city is predicated on living with luxuries.
22
Aristotle, Poetics, 1149a 10-19. See also chapter 13 of the work for his discussion on the best way to generate
the tragic effect.
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to show that the localized circumstance illuminates a particular facet of the human condition.
This illumination makes the facet intelligible because it utilizes a specific political experience in
order to generate pity and fear for one's own particular circumstance. Therefore, in this way, the
purpose of poetry is more political for Aristotle than it is for Plato, and thus, tragedy is better
than Homer.
Granting that Aristotle is responding to Plato's criticisms by making the poetry more
political, the question still remains as to what the purpose of katharsis actually is. Leon Golden
argues that katharsis is understood as a kind of intellectual clarification.23 Here, Golden is
arguing that the kathartic effect is not just to aim emotions toward their appropriate end, but to
provide an intellectual clarity about a specific facet of the human condition. He states that the,
"movement from the particular to the universal involves a learning process in that it renders
clearer and more distinct the significance of the events presented in the work of art."24 This
learning process is a kind of ascension away from the particulars and toward the universal, and
therefore, is something that is completely intellectual. The pleasures drawn from engaging with
tragedy, therefore, are wholly intellectual pleasures.
The pleasures derived from tragedy are predicated on the relationship between the
universal and the particular, and it is through understanding both that Aristotle says man has
pleasure at the sight of the mimetic arts.25 This pleasure is derived from our capacity to
understand the form that the art is representing as well as the compositional elements that are
specific to the expression of the artist. The example Aristotle gives is that of a painting; we

23

See Leon Golden, "Catharsis", Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 93 (1962),
pg. 51-60; Leon Golden, "Mimesis and Catharsis," Classical Philology 64 (1969), pg. 45-53.
24
Golden, "Catharsis," pg. 54.
25
Aristotle, Poetics, 1448b 5-10.
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delight in seeing the painting for what it represents as well as the way it is represented, and that
we receive a higher degree of pleasure if we have more knowledge of the represented subject.26
Therefore, in order to fully appreciate the experience of the mimetic arts, one must have a
baseline of knowledge that facilitates moving beyond the particulars of composition and into the
quality of the representation presented by the artist. A failure to have this baseline of knowledge
means that the mimetic experience is limited only to the expressive qualities of the art, which is
an incomplete mimetic experience. The full experience requires an understanding of the content
of the art in order to move beyond the particular art work and toward the form that the art is
representing. The association between the particular and the universal, then, is both a
prerequisite, since one must know what a particular art work is portraying to make the
relationship intelligible, and a consequence, since the work of art is going to provide an insight
into the relationship of the particular and the form, of engaging with the arts. Golden, then, is
correct in his assertion that the mimetic arts, specifically tragedy, serve as a teaching agent since
they generate a response in the observer that leads them from the particular piece of art and
toward the form that the piece of art is representing.
When Aristotle's perspective is understood within the previously established political
context of Greek poetry, Golden's assertion has an even stronger amount of validity. Poetic myth
already existed as a baseline for the audiences of the Athenian polis, and therefore, the
prerequisite threshold was already met. Therefore, tragedy is able to provide the audience an
educational lens for understanding a particular event. Golden argues that,
The process of inference described by Aristotle "clarifies" the nature of the individual act

26

Ibid, 1448b 15-18.

18

by providing, through the medium of art, the means of ascending from the particular
event witnessed to an understanding of its universal nature, and thus it permits us to
understand the individual act more clearly and distinctly.27
This 'ascension from the particular to the universal' is aimed specifically at events that arouse
pity and fear. Aristotle makes it explicitly clear that is the purpose of poetry six different times in
the Poetics. What, then, is audience member being pointed toward? Is it simply the intellectual
clarity that the tragedy provides in the ascension itself? This seems to be a particularly low
threshold, given Golden's claim that Aristotle argues, "that the function of art is to bring about a
clarification of reality. Thus art becomes a significant and respectable domain of philosophy."28
If tragedy is a part of philosophy, and its goal is to teach us about the reality of fear and pity and
cause us to ascend toward a higher realm of knowledge, what is the goal of that ascension?
Before turning to this point, however, Martha Nussbaum adds one criticism that is vital to better
understand the Aristotelian perspective on the purpose of poetry.
Nussbaum agrees that katharsis before Plato meant to 'purify' and that Plato's contribution
was to transform the word to mean 'to clear' or to 'clarify'.29 She goes beyond Golden's
perspective, though, when she states
In the context of rhetoric and poetry, especially in a work written in reaction to Platonic
criticism of the cognitive value of rhetoric and poetry, we would have strong reason not
only to translate the word this way but also to think of the 'clearing up' in question as
psychological, epistemological and cognitive, rather than as literally physical.30
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Nussbaum agrees with Golden's assertion that katharsis is a kind of clarification, but she notes
that Aristotle is responding to the Platonic conception of intellectual clarification. To her, the
Aristotelian perspective on katharsis rejects the notion of a purely intellectual clarification
because of Aristotle's perspective on the emotions.31 Her critique of Golden is insightful because
it highlights that Aristotle does not view the emotions as being a purely intellectual experience.
While Golden argues that Aristotle's views katharsis as a way to ascend toward a more
enlightened state of intellectual excellence, Nussbaum argues that this is far too Platonic. She
sees Plato's criticism of poetry is both of the form of poetry and of the poet himself; that the form
fails to move the audience toward knowledge and that the poet lacks a sense of self-reflective
awareness that is necessary to ascend toward knowledge.32 Therefore, the lack of a philosophic
underpinning within poetry means that it is incapable of aiming the audience toward the highest
things in life, and is only able to arouse emotions without the benefit of providing the clarity that
only philosophy can.
She argues that Aristotle rejects this Platonic notion of poetry, and therefore, Nussbaum
argues that Aristotle's understanding of poetry is as a more holistic aesthetic experience.
Aristotle, by maintaining the necessity of the emotional experience for human beings, presents a
defense of poetry. She argues, "that for Aristotle appropriate [emotional] responses are
intrinsically valuable parts of good character and can, like good intellectual responses, help to
constitute the refined 'perception' which is the best sort of human judgment." The emotional
responses one has toward a particular event is indicative of one's moral habituation, and
therefore, the emotions are an essential part of the human condition. If katharsis was only an
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intellectual experience, it would necessarily reject the notion that the emotions play a vital role in
the human experience, a position which Aristotle does not hold. However, this does not mean
that katharsis is a purely emotional response either.
In order to assess what kind of reaction katharsis is, it is beneficial to return to Aristotle's
understanding that the passions include a state of mind about one's place in the world.33 To have
such a cognitive awareness of one's place in the world is a uniquely human experience because it
is drawn from our rational faculties The kathartic release is rooted in this cognitive facet of the
soul, but more specifically, is rooted in the part of the soul that directs the passions. In the
Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the soul has both a rational and irrational component,
and that the human virtues are tethered to the rational faculties.34 The rational faculty is
understood to be the cause of human action since it is the facet which utilizes reason to align
actions to be in accord with virtue. The irrational part of the soul is divided into two pieces: the
vegetative which has, "no share in human excellence"35 and the appetitive which is only rational
enough to follow the dictates of reason.36 The rational facet of the soul is understood as the
ability to use the 'rational principle'.37 The question is where does kathartic clarification happen
inside of the soul - Is it a purely intellectual, that being the part of the soul that is utilizing the
rational principle? Is it in the appetitive part of the soul, meaning in the part of the soul that is
able to follow the dictates of reason? Is it in the irrational, nutritive part of the soul?
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The last question, whether katharsis is within the irrational part of the soul, can be
dismissed immediately since the nutritive part of the soul has no part in human excellence.
However, the other two questions mark the distinction between the Golden and Nussbaum
perspectives on katharsis. This distinction will also facilitate a better understanding of the
purpose of poetry. It's been established that poetry serves an educational end, but to what end is
still unclear. Nussbaum restores the vitality of emotional response to the Golden educative
perspective, which rightly returns the tension between appetitive and rational facets of soul.
Therefore, Nussbaum's argument that Aristotle's view of katharsis as a way to understand our
'perception' of who and what we are, is the most compelling. She claims,
That the pity and fear are not just tools of a clarification that is in and of the intellect
alone; to respond in these ways is itself valuable, and a piece of clarification concerning
who we are. It is a recognition of practical values, and therefore of ourselves, that is no
less important than the recognitions and perceptions of intellect.38
By responding to tragedy with both fear of the actions and pity for the actors, the audience is
provided a way to view themselves as human beings holistically, not just as intellectual
creatures.
The role of the passions, particularly of fear and pity, serve as a critical foundation for
Aristotle's entire ethical perspective, and therefore, it follows that his perspective on the passions
with regard to poetry would serve a similar, critical foundation. The passions are not things to be
purged or eliminated, but instead, are opportunities for human beings to learn about themselves.
In essence, Golden's argument of the ascension toward knowledge is maintained, but here, the
ascension is stripped of its Platonic overtones; the education of the soul toward the appropriate
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response to the passions, that is moral virtue, is as important as the education of the soul toward
intellect, that is intellectual virtue, for the human experience.
Before delving deeper into Aristotle's perspective on the purpose of poetry, it is essential
to address the criticism of this Golden/Nussbaum argument and to evaluate the merits of the
critique. Jonathan Lear contends that their position, while being true to certain facets of
Aristotle's thought, is not truly reflective of it. He has a series of objections to the 'poetry as a
moral educator' position. His first objection is with the notion that katharsis serves a purification
or purgation role vís-a-vís the emotions since a virtuous person, who has no need for further
emotional habituation, will still feel katharsis from a tragedy. His second objection is drawn from
Aristotle's argument about music from the Politics and this use of katharsis it conflicts with the
moral educator position. His third objection rejects the moral educative position because, he
contends, that the events portrayed on the stage and events experienced in real life will not have
the same emotional response. His fourth, and final, objection is that the moral educative
perspective fails to explain the peculiar pleasure of tragedy.39 These criticisms must be assessed
against the moral educator perspective to see whether or not it is tenable. By defending the
perspective, the inquiry will also assess whether or not Aristotle saw the purpose of poetry as a
moral educator, and provide more clarity on the relationship between politics, education, and
poetry.
Because music is a memetic art, the katharsis that comes music must be related to the
katharsis created by tragedy, and therefore, I will address the second of Lear's objections first.40
Aristotle opens book VIII of the Politics arguing that all people can, and should, be publically
39
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educated by the state because the individuals that comprise the state are intrinsically linked to the
purpose of politics, that is, to live well.41 The subsequent discussion of music education, its
origin, development, and utilization within the polis cannot be disconnected from this broader
understanding of the purpose of the city. Lear's discussion of musical katharsis, however, seems
to be devoid of this broader context. He claims that
Aristotle explicitly says that although one should use all the different types of melodies,
one should not use them for the same function. And when he says that music may be used
'for the sake of education and of katharsis', he is unambiguously listing different benefits
that may be derived from music.42
The passage Lear specifically is addressing I have mentioned previously43 but it is worth revisiting some of the passage here. Specifically, Aristotle says that music education has three
purposes, "(1) education, (2) katharsis, (3) intellectual enjoyment."44 Lear also cites Aristotle's
claim that, "It is clear, therefore, that all the modes must be employed by us, but not all of them
in the same manner."45 Even though Aristotle makes a distinction between the educational,
kathartic, and intellectual enjoyment of music, it all still falls within the overarching purpose of
public education whose aim is to teach people to live well. The issue, however, is derived from
understanding katharsis as a kind of clarification that serves an educational purpose. Lear's first
criticism, in essence, contends that because Aristotle makes a clear distinction between the moral
educative modes of music and the kathartic modes, the two cannot serve the same end. On the
surface, Lear's criticism seems to have strong merit because the distinction between the two
modes seems to be predicated on a distinction between two ends. However, viewing katharsis as
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a kind of emotional or intellectual point of clarification does not prevent it from serving an
educational function even if its end is not purely educational. Within this understanding, the
moral modes are aimed at teaching people to be virtuous, that is, to have a perspective toward the
world that is aligned with right reason. The kathartic modes, then, are aimed at developing one's
own sense of self as it relates to the emotional arousal of the passions.
Going further, Aristotle argues that katharsis is latent in the human experience and is
connected to our emotional nature. He says,
Those who are influenced by pity and fear, and every emotional nature, must have a like
experience, and others in so far as each is susceptible to such emotions, and all are in a
manner clarified and their souls lightened and delighted. The clarifying melodies likewise
give an innocent pleasure to mankind. Such are the modes and melodies in which those
who perform music at the theatre should be invited to compete.46

This passage indicates that one cannot disconnect what Aristotle says in the Politics from what
he says in the Poetics.47 Katharsis, then, cannot be understood as being the same as education,
but to say that clarity serves no educational purpose is incorrect. Instead, they should be
understood as different facets that interconnect with one another. Each mode serves its particular
function, and has its own particular end, but the end of the entire enterprise is still the education
of the individual in music for the purpose of living well. Beyond this, Aristotle is arguing that
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katharsis, specifically the emotional release, is an enjoyable experience for all people. This
indicates that the kathartic modes function on those who are either base or noble, educated and
not. This is the foundation of Lear's second criticism in the second objection on the moral
education position.
Lear contends that because Aristotle makes a distinction between audience types, this
rules out the ability for katharsis to have the same project as education. He states that
Aristotle contrasts two types of audience: the vulgar crowd composed of artisans and
laborers on the one hand, and those who are free and have already been educated on the
other. In each case the characters of the audience have been formed and ethical education
would be either futile or superfluous.48
Lear is using the Aristotelian cleavage between the virtuous and vulgar audience members out of
its context. Aristotle argues that any public performance inherently is going to vulgarize the
music that is performed49 since the performance is not done to enhance the excellence of the
performer but for the sake of the emotional experience of the audience. Therefore, when
Aristotle is speaking of education, it is critical to keep in consideration that Aristotle is speaking
of the education of an instrument for its own sake, and that through this education, one is made
more virtuous. Music heard in performance is inherently more vulgar than that produced by
oneself for its own sake, and therefore, the kathartic mode is more vulgar than the educational
modes. This vulgarity, however, does not preclude katharsis from being involved in education
since it shares in the overall purpose of being educated in music, which falls within the
parameters of the necessary public education. Lear's assertion, then, that katharsis cannot be
educative is based upon a distinction between the musical modes which he, in turn, makes into a
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distinction between the ends of the modes. The musical modes serve different functions but they
serve the same end, namely, educating individuals toward living well in political society.
Katharsis is not the same as the moral education provided by learning to play an
instrument because katharsis is not something one actively does. However, it can serve as an
educational tool for the passive reception of a music performance because it provides clarity for
a person's emotional state of mind vís-a-vís the passions just like tragedy does. Lear's objection
that katharsis is not the same as education is, on the surface, an accurate statement but does not
take into consideration the overarching purpose of music education itself, namely facilitating
people to live well in a political system, nor the possibility that there be a tiered-educational
structure that exists between the action of playing music and the reception of hearing music. I
will return to this issue later when I discuss the relationship between virtue, action, and plot as
well as the relationship between equity and poetry.
Lear's next objection is whether or not the virtuous audience member would benefit from
the katharsis of tragedy given that a virtuous person has no need for additional moral education.
Lear contends that, "the proper tragic plot would be appreciated and enjoyed above all by a
cultured person. It is hard to escape the conclusion that, for Aristotle, education is for youths,
tragic katharsis is for educated, cultivated adults."50 This is predicated on the idea that one who is
already virtuous is best going to appreciate the arts because they are going to be able to best
enjoy all things in life; this is without doubt. However, his contention that education is only for
youths is doubtful.
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Aristotle contends that youth is not the only factor when assessing the value of education,
and that youth is not predicated in years of life, but in the perspective on life. In book one of the
Nichomachean Ethics, he argues that,
Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is
inexperienced in actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are
about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and
unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no
difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not
depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs.
For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who
desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will
be of great benefit.51
To study the political arts, whose end is practical wisdom (phronesis) of how to live, is
predicated on the student understanding when to curb one's desires. This is the distinction
between one who is properly habituated and one who is youthful. One that has become properly
habituated understands that the inquiry into phronesis is inherently going to be more vague than
the inquiry into the sciences and it is not going to produce prescriptive accounts of events52 nor is
it going to facilitate direct action when one is swelled to act. For example, a political activist
would make a poor student of politics because their purpose for the inquiry is not to gain
knowledge about the best way to live, but instead, is aimed at acquiring knowledge to advance a
particular political position. They are incontinent. They have not developed the appropriate
alignment with proper reason to understand that their behaviors are brutish, and thus, are not
actually aimed at the best a human being can achieve. This, however, means that education is not
just reserved for the young but also those that lack self-control; both will benefit from moral
education.
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Those that are young, both in age and in perspective, lack self-control and therefore
benefit from moral education, but this does not answer the criticism of how katharsis effects
those who are already virtuous. Lear's assertion that the virtuous person is going to enjoy the
pleasures of poetry more is absolutely true because they are able to understand the appropriate
way to respond to the emotional developments of the productions. However, this presumes the
only thing one can gain from tragedy is the emotional experience. This is problematic,
particularly given Aristotle's methodology which begins by assessing the particulars of his time
and using them to understand the cause of actions. From the opening of the Nichomachean
Ethics to his inquiry into regime forms in the Politics, Aristotle's methodology into phronesis
begins with empirical observation, moves to compilation, and then to assessment. His
methodology indicates that his arguments have their origins in an inquiry into the intellectual
paradigm of his times, even if he goes on to provide a criticism of the opinions, customs, and
values of that very paradigm. Thus, for Aristotle to argue that the only experience one receives at
the theatre is an emotional one could not be drawn from the empirical arguments of his times, as
established above. His argument would have to be derived from a non-empirical source. The
only way that this would be possible is through a series of syllogisms that Aristotle does not spell
out, and therefore, it would be difficult to assume that this is Aristotle's perspective. Also, this
seemingly contradicts the way Aristotle handles the emotions in the Rhetoric.
Unless Aristotle is intending to disconnect his understanding of the emotions from the
Rhetoric with his discussions of the emotions in the Poetics and Nichomachean Ethics, it is not
possible that the kathartic experience of music is purely emotional. The virtuous person must
benefit in a different way. Since they are already virtuous, it follows that their emotional reaction
to the events will be done for the correct reason and with the correct magnitude, and therefore,
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the kathartic release will not generate a useful clarification. If, however, that kathartic release
was also connected to their intellectual capacities, which it must be since katharsis deals with
emotions, then the virtuous person would benefit from the kathartic release through an
intellectual reflection on the best actions for human being.
Therefore, Lear's assertion that education is limited only to the young is incorrect - those
that lack self-control also will benefit from education, but so too will the virtuous human being
gain from poetry because they have the moral foundation which allows for a higher level of
inquiry into the way one should live. This kind of education, the intellectual education, is where
Golden and Nussbaum do not extend their argument far enough; katharsis, as a form of
clarification, serves to enhance moral education by forcing the individual to assess whether or
not their emotional response to the events is appropriate, but it also allows the virtuous person to
enjoy the mimetic art as an intellectual inquiry into the condition of man. I will speak on this
again further in the essay, but it is critical to point out that Lear denies that katharsis plays a role
in the moral education of people, and thus, must contend that katharsis exists purely as a pleasure
with no other end. Given that Aristotle rejects this as a possibility for correct human action, his
criticism is flawed.
The next criticism to address is Lear's assertion that there is a disconnect between events
portrayed on the stage and events experienced in real life. This is predicated on Aristotle arguing
that we receive pleasure from seeing the events of tragedy. Lear contends that if we were to view
these mimetic events actually transpire, we would not derive any pleasure from the experience.53
He argues that,
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Thus there is a sense in which tragedy provides a poor training for the emotional
responses of real life; first, we should not be trained to seek out tragedy in real life, as we
do seek it in the theatre; second, we should not be trained to find any pleasure in real life
tragic events, as we do find pleasure in the tragic portrayals of the poets.54
His assertion that we should not seek out tragic events is an inappropriate utilization of the word
"tragedy." Elizabeth Vandiver contends that the Greek word tragôidia would be better
understood as a reference to the form of the artwork, not to the content.55 Thus, one could not
seek out, in this sense, tragôidia in real life anymore than one could seek out 'play' or 'movie.'
While Aristotle does argue that the content of tragedy, compared with comedy, is more serious
and deals with more noble things56, these things do not need violence to actually be effective.
Aristotle argues that Iphigenia in Tauris is reflective of the best kind of tragedy because the
recognition of error does not require the use of violence.57 Tragedy generates fear and pity
through its form, which is not dependent on its content. The latter being a reflection of the kinds
of characters the poets have chosen to write about, namely those who are noble,58 whereas the
former is a particular kind of artistic form that facilitates the poets to tell stories about noble
characters.
This, however, does not answer the issue of the pleasure derived from tragedy, which is
Lear's final criticism to address. Lear argues, from his third criticism, that tragedy generates
pleasure even as it portrays others in events that would be horrifying if they took place in reality.
This, however, is problematic. Aristotle defines tragedy as
A representation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in
itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the
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parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and
fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions.59
The purpose of the tragedy is to generate pity and fear since these two emotions are associated
with those things that are serious, and noble, through a complete action of the characters. This
allows for the katharsis of the emotions. The pleasure is gained through the katharsis experience.
However, what provides the pleasure? Lear, again, inappropriately blends the form with the
content. The form of tragedy is predicated on the plot,60 which is a representation of a complete
human action. It is through the mimesis that we receive the pleasure because it allows our
intellect to be active.61 Specifically regarding the case of tragedy, the audience is able to perceive
the completeness of human action - the causes of the events are intelligible to us and not derived
from chance.62 Therefore, the nobility that underlay the content of tragedy, namely those things
that are serious in nature, generate fear and pity in the audience for the characters that endure
serious events. The emotional generation is not connected to the pleasure derived from tragedy.
The pleasure one experiences is being able to understand that the cause of a particular event is
derived from human action, not from chance. Katharsis is experiencing the gravity of the events
presented in tandem with understanding that they are caused by human action. The pleasure is
not seeing suffering but understanding the cause of the suffering. Lear's criticism that
understanding katharsis as an educative agent causes an inappropriate understanding of how to
behave in real life situations is based in an incorrect assessment of what makes a tragedy tragic.
Lear does provide his own conception of katharsis and this must be assessed before
returning back to the Golden/Nussbaum argument and seeing whether or not the educational
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perspective is, in fact, a viable one. Lear contends that katharsis must meet a series of seven
criteria that are predicated on his rejection of the previous understandings of katharsis. The
criteria are:
(1) There is reason for a virtuous man to experience the performance of a tragedy: he too
will experience a katharsis of pity and fear.
(2) Tragic katharsis cannot be a process that is essentially and crucially corrective: that
is, it cannot be a purgation, insofar as purgation is of something pathological or noxious;
it cannot be a purification of some pollution; it cannot be an education of the emotions.
(3) What one feels at the performance of tragedy is not what one would or should feel in
the real life counterpart.
(4) A proper audience does not lose sight of the fact that it is enjoying the performance of
a tragedy.
(5) The mere expression or release of emotions is not in itself pleasurable.
(6) Katharsis provides a relief: it is either itself pleasurable or it helps to explain the
proper pleasure that is derived from tragedy.
(7) The events which in a tragedy properly provoke the pity and fear from which tragic
katharsis occurs must be such that the audience believes that such events could happen to
them.63
His first two criteria are linked together because the second criterion is predicated on the validity
of the first. Therefore, these two will be addressed in tandem. The third through seventh also
work as a unit. This is because the third makes a distinction between the emotions one feels
within the theatre compared to those felt outside of the theatre. The inquiry into this block of
criteria, then, will be predicated on this distinction.
To the first criteria, it is clear that Aristotle sees katharsis as being a universal human
experience.64 Therefore, Lear's criterion here is correct. Katharsis must be something that is a
universal human response to the events of a tragedy, and must be able to affect both the virtuous
and the vulgar in kind. This leads to the second criterion, which indicates that katharsis must not
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be something that is corrective since it must apply to both the virtuous and vulgar - what does a
virtuous person need to be corrected on? Here, Lear argues that,
The virtuous man is not a pathological condition, nor is he polluted with some impure
element which needs to be removed. Nor is he in need of any further training of the
emotions: indeed, it is because he is already disposed to respond appropriately to the
situations of life, both in judgment, action and emotion, that he is virtuous.65
He is correct in his criticism of the assertion that katharsis is a purging or purification of the
emotions as well as his claim that the virtuous man does not need further education in the
emotions. This last point, however, does not preclude that katharsis can serve as an educative
tool even for the virtuous man since the purpose of katharsis is not to educate the emotions
directly, but instead, to facilitate a reflection within the individual as a self-clarification, either
emotionally or intellectually.
This leads to the third criterion that the emotions generated by a tragedy are not the same
emotions generated by seeing the same events transpire in one's own life. This however, is
flawed, and thus, undermines the effectiveness of using the subsequent criteria as the foundation
for a new understanding of katharsis. The point that the association between the events
represented in the tragedy compared to the events that transpire in reality must generate a
different kind of emotional response is flawed. The mimetic arts are designed to be reflective of
reality, and it is in this reflection that we find the appropriate pleasure.66 The pleasure is derived
from acknowledging the relationship between the representation and the reality. This pleasure, in
the case of tragedy, is found in the form of the play because the causes of the events are
intelligible to the audience. The events are as horrifying if one observes them as a representation
or in actuality; the pleasure is derived from understanding the causes of the events. Therefore,
65
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tragedy isn't designed to teach one a pleasure associated with watching horrifying events. Rather,
tragedy is designed to be a mime of the potential real world. In light of this, the third criterion,
which establishes a cleave between the world of tragedy and real life, is fundamentally flawed.
His fourth criterion, that the release of an emotion itself cannot be the pleasure from
tragedy, is correct but his reasoning for this is flawed. It is predicated on the notion that the
emotions are generated in real life differently than they are in the theatre; that to experience
something fearful in the former is qualitatively different than experiencing it in the later. This,
however, seems to contradict Aristotle's notion67, and Lear's own seventh criteria, that one must
believe that the events portrayed on stage can actually happen to the individual. The emotions
that are generated, then, are paralleled inside or outside of the theatre. If one must believe that
the events of Medea could happen to oneself, then the associated pity one has for the characters
and the fear one has of the events is connected to the fact that one may endure the events
themselves. The emotional response to the tragedy is predicated on the blurring of the lines
between the representation and reality. If this is not the case, and the emotions that are aroused
are not genuine to reality, then the kathartic effect only serves as a pleasure derived from
entertainment, and it means that Aristotle is wrong in his assertion that we enjoy the mimetic arts
for their representation of reality.
This notion, however, violates the idea that the emotions are not simply the feelings
associated with the particular passion, but are also connected to a state of mind.68 For the
audience member to actually have their passions aroused, they have to believe that the events
that they are seeing are believable, so much so that they believe they could happen to them.
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Therefore, the notion that the kind of emotional response that happens in the theatre is different
from that outside of the theatre is fundamentally flawed, both from Aristotle's perspective but it
also doesn't align with Lear's own seventh criterion. However, the fact that the audience member
must always be aware of the fact that they are engaging with a work of mimesis is a correct one.
He contends that,
Tragic poetry provides an arena in which one can imaginatively experience the tragic
emotions; the performance of a play 'captures our souls.' However, it is crucial to the
pleasure we derive from tragedy, that we never lose sight of the fact that we are an
audience, enjoying a work of art. Otherwise the pleasurable katharsis of pity and fear
would collapse into the merely painful experience of those emotions.69
The emotions of pity and fear are painful emotions70, which affirms the correctness of his fifth
criterion. If any pleasure is to be associated with their arousal, it is through the understanding
that the audience is not, in actuality, enduring the events that are transpiring on the stage. The
emotions the audience is feeling are not qualitatively different simply because they are derived
from an artwork; the emotions that they are feeling are genuine. However, the fact that they are
able to engage with them through observing another mired in a painful situation allows the
audience to move beyond feeling the painful emotions, and experience something greater.
Therefore, in response to his sixth criterion, the pleasure comes from understanding that the
mistakes (hamartia) made by the tragic hero have a discernible cause to the audience member.71
The pity one feels for the suffering of Oedipus is genuine, and the fear one feels is derived from
the association between the character traits of the audience member and Oedipus's character
traits; these are painful things to endure. The pleasure comes from understanding that Oedipus's
hamartia is derived from his nature; it is intelligible to the audience member that Oedipus is the
69
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cause of his own downfall.72 This does not take place in reality; suffering and hardship may
affect anyone by chance.73 This is why the audience must remember that they are watching a
representative art - they are able to understand the causes of actions, which provides pleasure
whereas in reality, there is no guarantee that suffering will ever be intelligible.
Lear, then, is correct when he asserts that, "The world of tragic events must, Aristotle
repeatedly insists, be rational. The subject of tragedy may be a good man, but he must make a
mistake which rationalizes his fall."74 This intelligibility is derived from the form of tragedy
because it is an account of a full human action. The cause and effect of the hamartia are
presented in their entirety, and thus, are intelligible to the audience member. This intelligibility is
the pleasure derived from the tragic form. Lear, however, contends that Oedipus is the "paradigm
tragedy" which indicates that
In Aristotle's conception of tragedy, the individual actor takes on the burden of badness,
the world as a whole is absolved...that even when they are responsible for their
misfortunes, humans remain capable of conducting themselves with dignity and
nobility.75
This assertion, however, is incorrectly founded. Aristotle argues that Oedipus Rex is the most
effective at generating the tragic effect because of the sensational nature of the events, but not
that is the best form of tragedy. For this, as already noted, is exemplified by plays such as
Iphigenia in Tauris. It is better in its form because it does not require the vulgar sensationalism
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that the violence of the Oedipus story does; rather, it ends with both tragic heroes being able to
continue to live their lives.76 Instead, the tragic effect is generated by the form of the play. Lear’s
assertion that the tragic hero bears the ‘burden of badness’ inappropriately conflates the content
of tragedy with the form. The form generates the tragic experience, not the content. What
Aristotle indicates is that the plot of Oedipus is capable of generating much more pity and fear
than other tragedies, but that it is not the best in form which means that katharsis is not
predicated on the onus of the events but in the cohesiveness of the plot.
Ultimately, Lear rightly points out that the virtuous person is going to also benefit from
the kathartic experience and that katharsis is not the same moral education. He is incorrect in that
katharsis cannot serve a educative function, for it does. Also, he does not provide an adequate
new definition of what katharsis is because his perspective is predicated on a flawed foundation.
Thus, Lear fails to provide a sufficient rebuttal to the moral education perspective. However, his
criticisms do provide insights into where the Golden/Nussbaum perspective can be, and should
be, enhanced.
Katharsis, then, is understood as the pleasure the audience feels after a particular emotion
has been aroused and released in a intelligible way that is derived from the form of the mimetic
art. In the case of both music and tragedy, katharsis is derived not from the creation of the art but
from the reception of it - for music, in listening to a performance; for tragedy, in observing the
events of the play. This means that katharsis is produced when one is passively receiving the
product of another's actions, and therefore, is inherently more vulgar than producing the art for
its own sake. Katharsis must serve a particular purpose that is outside of praxis but still within
the realm of education broadly since katharsis is included as one of the benefits from music
76
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education. The purpose cannot be to purge or purify the emotions since, for Aristotle, the
emotions are not just feelings but states of mind. It, however, is not a purely rational experience
because the emotions must be aroused as a prerequisite.
Katharsis, then, is an experience that comes from interacting with the mimetic arts, built
upon the emotional arousal from them, and is connected to our delight in seeing those things that
are mimetic. It is a combination of the intellectual enjoyment of seeing a representation of life in
art and the pacification of the aroused emotions through an understanding of the connection
between the particular piece of art and the universal condition of man that the art is reflecting.
Therefore, katharsis should be understood as a kind of clarification, both emotionally and
intellectually, that one experiences when interacting with the mimetic arts. It is aligned with
education, but not education in itself. Instead, katharsis is the natural human reaction to mimesis
that is able to serve as a bridge between the vulgar experience of receiving the poeisis of another
and self-reflection. This self-reflection serves either as the foundation to pursue moral education
or the beginning of an intellectual inquiry into the universal condition of man that the poeisis is
representing.

EQUITY AND THE PURPOSE OF POEISIS

Even establishing the political condition of poetry and a working definition of katharsis,
the fundamental question still remains: what is the purpose of poetry? The use of katharsis as one
of the purposes of the mimetic arts indicates that Aristotle saw the performance of a tragedy to
be a fully aesthetic experience since katharsis serves both an emotional and intellectual function.
He argues that the emotional outpouring is the more vulgar tragic experience because the
virtuous individual will utilize katharsis as a foundation for reflection on the human condition.
What purpose, however, would this reflection serve other than pure intellectual pleasure?
Aristotle explicitly does not allow the end of virtuous activity to be only pleasure1 and therefore,
the function of this self-reflection must be aimed at a different end. One potential purpose could
be causing the virtuous person to look beyond their political conventions and toward what is best
for a human being in an unqualified sense. This establishes a tension between the particular
political reality and the universal human condition. This tension is the foundation for the
subsequent exploration of why Aristotle argues that history is less philosophic than poetry, on
the role of justice regarding the moral and intellectual virtues, and on the relationship between
equity and poeisis. This exploration's purpose is to explore why this tension is so prevalent in
Aristotle's thought, and how that tension shapes Aristotle's understanding of the purpose of
poeisis, and how that purpose is illuminative regarding the moral and intellectual virtues.
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Aristotle contends that history is less philosophic than poetry because it only accounts for
particular human actions, and therefore, lacks an insight into the universal human condition. He
argues
[history] describes the thing that has been, and [poetry] a kind of thing that might be.
Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of a graver import than history, since its
statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars.2
The particularized nature of history means that it is unable to look beyond the specific toward the
universal. Poetry, on the other hand, is able to speak about universal conditions through
particular character's actions, and thus, in this way, is more philosophic. History is an
amalgamation of particulars without regard to a guiding principle (arche) whereas poetry is
predicated on the arche.
For poetry to be more philosophical than history, it is critical for the arche to be
consistent throughout the work. Malcolm Heath argues that the universal is understood as, "the
sense that what happens in accordance with necessity or probability (or in other words, always
for the most part) instantiates general principles."3 Thus, the arche here are not eternal truths, but,
instead, are consistent actions of the characters within the work which portray some specific
facet of the human condition. In this way, poetry represents the beginning, middle, and end of an
action because we are able to see the arche through the episodic interaction of the characters.
Heath continues that Aristotle
Does not treat the 'single action' of tragedy or epic as some one thing that some one
person does; he tends rather to speak of the action having 'agents' in the plural; so for
Aristotle, too, the action of tragedy or epic is an interaction.4
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Actions require interactions, which is the foundation of why Aristotle argues that plots are more
essential to tragedy than character.5 The causes of actions are only made intelligible when they
are placed within the natural context of human life.
An example of this comes from Sophocles' account of Antigone. It displays her as a
character driven by an extreme religiosity so her subsequent actions should be aligned with the
form of someone who is extremely religious. Therefore, when she violates the decree of her
uncle that prohibits her from burying her brother, her actions are connected back to the driving
principle. Her actions, as standalone events devoid of interaction, are unintelligible. However,
once they are placed within the context of her uncle's actions, her arche is clarified. Her hamartia
is derived from the arche, which is made intelligible to the audience through the progression of
the plot. History lacks this account of the arche and the intelligibility of why certain actors
engage with one another, either through necessity or probability, because it lacks a guiding
structure for the interaction of the characters.
Poetry's superiority to history, then, is due to the plot. Aristotle argues that the plot is, in
essence, the arche of tragedy. He says
We maintain, therefore, that the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of Tragedy is
the Plot; and that the Characters come second - compare the parallel in painting where the
most beautiful colors laid on without order will not give one the same pleasure as a
simple black-and-white sketch of a portrait. We maintain that Tragedy is primarily an
imitation of action, and that it is mainly for the sake of the action that it [represents] the
personal agents.6
Characters, in a sense, are parallel to the particulars of history. They provide meaning to the
plot's development of tragedy, but in isolation, they are devoid of purpose. The plot, which
shows the actions and interactions of the characters, is what provides tragedy its meaning and
5
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facilitates its overall purpose of tragedy. Without the structure provided by plot, the characters'
interactions would be as chaotic and purposeless as those interactions in history, and therefore,
would provide no insight into the universals of the human condition. Poetry would become an
artificial history, and thus, would no longer be more philosophic than history. It would also mean
that human interaction is inherently unintelligible since even the creative representations of our
actions are devoid of intelligible purpose.
Poetry and history, however, are not completely disconnected from one another. B.L.
Ullman argues that poetry and history are both aimed at providing an insight into the true nature
of human life. The distinction between history and poetry is that poetry is able to provide an
account for the foundations of the actions and therefore is superior.7 History serves the purpose
of giving an account of events that did take place, poetry gives an account of things that could
have taken place. This is why Aristotle argues Homer was so effective with his account of the
Trojan War. He says
We have a further proof of Homer's marvelous superiority to the rest. He did not attempt
to deal even with the Trojan war in its entirety, thought it was a whole with a definite
beginning and end...he has singled out one section of the whole...8
The Homeric epics are successful because they do not attempt to provide an accurate, historical
account of the myriad events that took place over the decade long war. Instead, they focus on the
actions of a few, in a narrowed space of time, because they are attempting to highlight something
specific about the human condition.
7
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This desire to understand the causes of the human condition, Aristotle argues, is latent in
our nature, 9 and is also what makes human beings distinct from other animals.10 Contemplation
is what makes us more divine.11 To utilize this contemplative capacity and seek out arche, then,
is the purpose of philosophy. Since history only provides an account, no matter how thorough, of
particular events and does not look toward the arche, history is less contemplative, and therefore,
is less philosophical than poetry. Poetry, a representation of a complete human action, starts with
the arche and is developed episodically after that.12 Therefore, the creation of poetry begins from
a more philosophical foundation and is also more philosophic in its form. The arche is
intelligible because tragedy contains an identifiable cause and effect structure where the events
of the play are derived from human action and not from chance.
However, it is critical to establish that poetry is not philosophy, nor is it aimed at the
same purpose as philosophy. It is clear from the discussion of katharsis that the mimetic arts are
not aimed at providing explanations of arche. The purpose of tragedy is to arouse the emotions of
pity and fear and release them in a way that brings clarity.13 The purpose of music is to educate,
clarify, and bring intellectual enjoyment.14 The purpose of painting is to enjoy the association
between the particular of the work and the form that it represents.15 None of these things are the
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purpose of philosophy, which is to seek out first principles. The contemplative life, which is
necessary for philosophy, is predicated on one being morally virtuous. The life of a poet does not
have to be morally virtuous nor is the creation of poetry a product of the contemplative life.
Aristotle is clear that the virtues, both moral and intellectual, are superior to the mimetic
arts because the virtues are actions and poetry is a product of an action.16 This, however, is
somewhat problematic. Given that poetry is derived from using contemplative virtue to construct
plots, thus making both the creative act and the creative product aligned, in a sense, with
philosophy, it is curious why Aristotle places the mimetic arts below the contemplative and
moral virtues. It is beneficial to examine Aristotle's argument and see the nature of this tension
and what it can tell us about the purpose poetry.
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle is clear that the arts are inferior to the virtues
because the former are done to produce something else whereas the later are done for their own
sake. He says
Again, the case of the arts and that of their virtues are not similar; for the products of the
arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain
character, but if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain
character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately.17
If one were to create a piece of art that is excellent, it would be identified as having an excellent
representation of the source, excellent color, excellent line, etc. The excellence of the art is not
found in the creation (poeisis) of the art (techne) but in the art itself. The virtues, however, are
virtuous because they make one excellent by doing them. The virtues, therefore, are sought out
for their own sake because their excellence exists within the practice of the virtue whereas the
productive arts are aimed at creating something that has an excellence in the product. This is due
16
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to the fact that self-sufficiency is the most important evaluative standard for assessing the
nobility of an activity. For example, he argues in the Metaphysics that God is going to seek out
the most self-sufficient activity, contemplation, because it is the highest thing that can be done
for its own sake.18 He also establishes self-sufficiency as one of the defining characteristics for
happiness and why it is the telos of human action.19 Therefore, because mimesis is not done for
its own sake but for the sake of the product, it is more vulgar than seeking out virtue for its own
sake. Mimesis, then, cannot be the highest activity for human beings, nor can its aim be the
highest for human beings. The productive arts are those which are necessary to human life, but
are not those which allow for the highest excellence unique to human life.
One difficulty arises, however, when presented with the question of how one should live
their life. Aristotle argues that politics serve as the best form of action (praxis) of a human being
but also that the contemplative life is the best life a human being can lead. If one is a politician,
their aspiration is to create laws that are aligned with virtue, which is drawn from having
practical wisdom (phronesis).20 Phronesis is the utilization of the correct action at the correct
time for the correct reason, and, as it relates to the practical sciences, is essential for virtue.21 If
one is engaging in the contemplative life, one is aiming at the knowledge (episteme) of arche.
The contemplative life is disconnected from the practical facets of political life. Both are referred
to as the best lives a human being can live, but the two are in conflict with one another. A life
predicated on phronesis is going to give one wisdom for utilizing virtue to lead an excellent life
whereas the contemplative life is going to give one wisdom of arche for its own sake. This
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tension, between politics and philosophy, again mirrors the tension between the particular and
the form. Aristotle's hierarchy of knowledge is predicated on this tension, with techne being the
lowest, poeisis being the next highest, phronesis being the next, and episteme being the highest.
However, this knowledge hierarchy becomes even more problematic when attempting to assess
the purpose of poetry since it seems to be derived from the second lowest rung but associated
with the highest.
This hierarchy is also present in Aristotle's distinction between the moral virtues and the
intellectual virtues. Aristotle's ethics are concerned with evaluating the excellence of a particular
action (moral virtue) and in knowing the universal principle (intellectual virtue) that is to be
applied. The intellectual hierarchy, then, is predicated on this distinction between what is best for
the nonrational and rational parts of the soul.22 The appetitive part of the nonrational soul is what
is educated in regard to the moral virtues, and thus, is going to be more vulgar than intellectual
virtue. Human beings are excellent in their intellectual capacities since this is what is divine.23
The moral virtues, being more base than the intellectual virtues, still serve a vital role in human
life, and, in some ways, are more essential to it, but fall into the phronesis rung and not the
episteme. Aristotle, however, seems use to equity as a bridge to address this tension.
He contends that equity exists to fill in the gap between universal justice and the
particular just act. Equity is defined as, "a correction of law where it is defective owing to its

22

See Jess Moss, "'Virtue Makes the Goal Right': Virtue and Phronesis in Aristotle's Ethics," Phronesis 56 (2011),
204-261. I agree in large part with her assertion that the moral virtues are not contemplative, and thus, require an
intervening cognitive action in order to aim them at the mean. This indicates phronesis is a critical component for
to have virtuous action. The moral virtues are found in the non-rational part of the soul that responds to reason
but does have not command over it. Thus, in order to utilize virtue in correct action, one needs a facilitator, and
this, she argues, is the role of phronesis.
23
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1177a 13-18.

47

universality."24 Equity negotiates the tension between the universal and the particular. Equity,
however, does not exist as a flaw within justice but in the application of justice.25 Kathy Eden
argues that
The law is simple, general, and precise; the actions of men are infinite and individual. As
a corrective, flexible measure, equity negotiates between the universality of the law and
the randomness of particular circumstance to produce a judgment more appropriate to the
specific case.26
Equity, then, also highlights the deficiency in the application of the law. It serves the function of
identifying the mean between the political universal - law - and the political particular - the case.
Equity, then, is not simply a correction for the overly generalized law, but actually is a way to
address the tension between episteme and techne - a judicial phronesis. However, this does not
address the problematic issue of how one learns of the gap between the universal and the
particular. Aristotle contends that the law is how most people learn to act virtuously. He says
that, "the majority of the acts commanded by the law are those which are prescribed from the
point of view of virtue taken as a whole; for the law bids us practise every virtue and forbids us
to practise any vice."27 Thus, if the law is an educative agent for the masses, not in that it teaches
them to be virtuous people but teaches them to act in a virtuous way, how is one to learn the
deficiencies in the application of the law?
Here, it is beneficial to look at Eden's argument concerning the relationship between
equity and poetry.28 She points out that, "the law is to human actions which fall under its
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jurisdiction as the universal is to the particular."29 Law, in this account, serves the same function
as universal truths do in ethics, or as the universal human condition does in poetry. Equity, being
a corrective agent in the application of the universal to the particular, is similar to poetry. She
argues that, "described in this way....equity in ethical and legal sciences corresponds to fiction in
the literary arts."30 Therefore, both serve a corrective function since they both are aiming at
understanding the actions of a particular in relation to the universal. She says, "Like equity,
poetry undertakes to reveal the causes of action in the form of the agents' intentions."31 Poetry,
being derived from the arche, is aimed at showing how a universal may be actualized in a
specific human action. The law is the universal principle which guides action in a political
society, and its application is interpreted through equity. Therefore, both serve as a way to make
the tension between the particular and the universal intelligible.
Thus, Eden asserts that that equity and poetry are, in a sense, parallels. She claims that
Equity is superior to absolute justice for the same reason that poetry is superior to history.
Unlike absolute justice, which embodies only universals, and history, which is enslaved
to particulars, equity and poetry approach the relative mean.32
Her assertion, however, is flawed. Poetry does not really serve as a means between two actions
in the same way equity does. Poetry is a product of techne and therefore it is not an action
whereas equity is an action. Given the primacy of action for Aristotle, equity would be superior
to poetry, and thus, they cannot be paralleled in this way. Equity is something one does; poetry is
something one receives. She fails to make this distinction, and therefore, the association she
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makes between the two is fundamentally flawed. This, however, does not mean that poetry
cannot serve a vital function nor that equity cannot provide an insight into the purpose of poetry,
but poetry cannot be equated with equity.
Where equity can help provide some insight into the purpose of poetry is in its role as
phronesis. Eden contends that
Aristotle upholds fiction over history as the more scientific and consequently as the
worthier discipline because it embodies the universal in a set of circumstances made
credibly by their specificity...fiction mediates between universal propositions and
particular instances, making the individuality of experience demonstrable and therefore
comprehensible.33
Her assertion that poetry is better because it is able to display the universal through the
particulars, and thus, make the universal intelligible, is correct. Understanding poetry as a mean
indicates that either poetry is a virtue itself, which it cannot be since it is a product of the
mimetic arts, or that the poet has a representative practical wisdom, or a mimetic phronesis.
Mimetic phronesis would mean that the poet is able to create something in way that utilizes the
universal in the best way while being aimed at the telos. The telos of tragedy means that mimetic
phronesis would be in crafting a story that is noble in character, serious in action, and a catalyst
for the kathartic experience with pity and fear. However, since phronesis is necessary for the
correct utilization of the virtues toward the correct end, would the same be true of this mimetic
phronesis? Is tragedy only aimed at generating pity and fear and then providing the kathartic
release of such emotions? Or could Aristotle be agreeing with the notion that the poet is
didaskalos, and therefore, poetry would have an epistemological function? In order to assess this,
we must first look at the relationship, if any, between poetry and virtue.
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If any relationship were to exist between poetry and virtue, it would have to be predicated
on the emotions. Tragedy, specifically, arouses fear and pity. Courage, specifically, is predicated
on overcoming fear, and perhaps, most specifically, fear of death.34 Since the fear that one feels
within the theatre has to be the same fear one would feel outside of the theatre,35 the fear one
must overcome to be courageous is also the same. Therefore, as one is watching the episodes of a
play unfold and one's fear is triggered by the events, does courage play a role? It would be
incorrect to assert that by watching tragedy, one would become courageous, for the passivity in
watching a play inherently means one cannot become habituated to the action of courage. What
is possible, however, is to see a courageous act take place within the plot of the story. Therefore,
the fear that the audience feels is, in actuality, a representation of the fear that the characters are
enduring within the events of the tragedy. Thus, when the characters in the play act in a
courageous way, the audience is able to observe an example of a courageous act. The poet, here,
is able to teach the audience about the nature of a courageous act, and the way in which the
universal being examined in the play is demonstrative of the tension between the virtue and the
vice; how events that generate great fear can result in either courage or cowardice.
This, however, cannot be educative toward the moral virtues because one becomes
virtuous by doing virtuous acts, not observing them.36 Watching a tragedy is inherently a passive
activity, as is observing or hearing any other mimetic art, and thus, they cannot be understood as
habituating the audience. Could this passivity be the reason that Aristotle is so critical of teche,
including the mimetic arts? Virtue is inherently better than art because it is an action for itself,
not for something greater. But the form of poetry seems to indicate that, while being inferior to
34

Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, pg. 1115b 19-21.
See the above critique of Lear's seventh criterion, pg. 31-33.
36
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1104a 26-30.
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virtue, it is not cleaved from those higher things. Carli argues that form, "is both the driving
force that guides the orderly development of natural things towards their full realization, and the
actualization of their nature, that is to say, their final cause, or telos."37 Tragedy's form is found
through its plot and through its arousing of fear and pity and the kathartic release of those
emotions. The audience is passive as they observe the progression of the events in the tragedy,
but the clarification provided by the plot transforms the passivity into an activity because while
the emotional arousal is involuntary (or perhaps nonvoluntary),38 the kathartic effect of selfreflection is a catalyst to contemplation, and thus, is the cause of an action.
The purpose of poeisis, then, is a particularly odd one in political life. It is both a passive
experience and a cause for action. Thus, tragedy, as the highest form of the mimetic arts, in this
sense, becomes dual phronesis - one between the vulgar and the virtuous, and another between
the moral and the intellectual. Katharsis, by causing a self-reflection in the audience member,
transforms the passive experience of watching a tragedy into an active self-reflection. For the
vulgar, it is aimed toward a particular moral act, namely courage, and the way in which the
courageous act exemplifies the best in human action. For the virtuous, it is aimed at
understanding a specific facet of human excellence, namely the noble or serious actions
displayed through the tragedy. That facet illuminates a truth about the human condition. The
37

Carli, "Poetry is More Philosophical than History," pg. 307.
See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book 3 Chapter 1 . Here, it is difficult to distinguish these two since the
emotional arousal, in and of itself, is not a voluntary act. No one is able to deliberate and choose to feel an
emotion; it is aroused by an external cause, and thus, is simply felt. However, one does choose to attend the
festival where the play is being performed, and thus, allows one's emotions to be aroused. It would be odd,
though, to say that one is responsible for the arousal of the emotions by observing a play or that one would feel
shame for feeling those feelings. Thus, the emotional arousal of the audience because of poetry cannot be
identified as voluntary, nor nonvoluntrary. However, by placing oneself in the audience, one is voluntarily choosing
to engage in the material but cannot know how the emotions will be effected. Thus, it could be rendered
nonvoluntary since the emotional arousal cannot be identified as something one would feel shame for
(involuntary) or that one is responsible for (voluntary). How one acts after the arousal would be voluntary, but the
arousal itself cannot be understood in this way.
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active self-reflection, then, is both moral and intellectual and, in a way, a bridge between both
the vulgar and the virtuous. Both are able to enjoy the release of the emotions generated by the
tragedy, and both are able to transcend their particular condition and understand something
higher than themselves. Therefore, the poet is a didaskalos in the sense that through the form of
his art, he is able to generate a reflection on the excellence of human action and the nature of
man.

CONCLUSION

Poeisis is the art of producing something artificial, be it a piece of technology, a weapon,
or a work of art. Poeisis is translated as poetry so to understand Aristotle's perspective on the
purpose of poeisis, one must look at his complicated account in the Poetics. There, he identifies
tragedy as the best form of poetry, and thus, all subsequent discussion of poetry must be about its
highest form, namely tragedy. But poeisis could also be translated as artificial stories, or, in the
modern vernacular, as fiction. Therefore, by looking into Aristotle's perspective on the purpose
of poetry, one is able to see a framework for understanding fiction more broadly. This
perspective, however, cannot be utilized to assess all works of fiction since we lack his account
of the vulgar, namely comedies. It can, however, be utilized to assess works of fiction that are
tragic. This means that they are exploring the most noble things for a human being, namely, in
overcoming fear and enduring great hardship for the sake of human excellence. This is perhaps
the most vital thing Aristotle brings to the inquiry of the relationship between fiction and politics
- the later is aimed at facilitating people to live well where the former is aimed at providing an
account of human excellence in action.
Tragedies, in their form, are quite different from modern fiction, however, and therefore
it is important to not create a false equivalency. Aristotle's account of tragedy provides insight
into form of fiction that deals with the best human actions, but the performance elements of an
ancient tragedy are anachronistic to a modern audience. This, however, does not mean that his
insight into the role that katharsis plays for an audience, the intellectual opportunity fiction
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provides to an audience, or the importance for understanding the balance between moral and
intellectual virtue in our creative accounts of human excellence, are not still as valid today in our
inquiries into our fiction as it was for his inquiry into his fiction in the 4th century BCE.
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